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Abstract
In this paper we combine Answer Set Programming (ASP) with Dynamic Linear Time
Temporal Logic (DLTL) to define a temporal logic programming language for reasoning
about complex actions and infinite computations. DLTL extends propositional temporal
logic of linear time with regular programs of propositional dynamic logic, which are used
for indexing temporal modalities. The action language allows general DLTL formulas to be
included in domain descriptions to constrain the space of possible extensions. We introduce
a notion of Temporal Answer Set for domain descriptions, based on the usual notion of
Answer Set. Also, we provide a translation of domain descriptions into standard ASP and
we use Bounded Model Checking techniques for the verification of DLTL constraints.
KEYWORDS: Answer Set Programming, Temporal Logic, Bounded Model Checking.
1 Introduction
Temporal logic is one of the main tools used in the verification of dynamic systems.
In the last decades, temporal logic has been widely used also in AI in the context
of planning, diagnosis, web service verification, agent interaction and, in general,
in most of those areas having to do with some form of reasoning about actions.
The need of temporally extended goals in the context of planning has been first
motivated in (Bacchus and Kabanza 1998; Kabanza et al. 1997; Giunchiglia and Traverso 1999).
In particular, (Giunchiglia and Traverso 1999) developed the idea of planning as
model checking in a temporal logic, where the properties of planning domains are
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formalized as temporal formulas in CTL. In general, temporal formulas can be use-
fully exploited both in the specification of a domain and in the verification of its
properties. This has been done, for instance, for modeling the interaction of services
on the web (Pistore et al. 2005), as well as for the specification and verification of
agent communication protocols (Giordano et al. 2007). Recently, Claßen and Lake-
meyer (Claßen and Lakemeyer 2008) have introduced a second order extension of
the temporal logic CTL*, ESG, to express and reason about non-terminating Golog
programs. The ability to capture infinite computations is important as agents and
robots usually fulfill non-terminating tasks.
In this paper we combine Answer Set Programming (ASP) (Gelfond 2007) with
Dynamic Linear Time Temporal Logic (DLTL) (Henriksen and Thiagarajan 1999)
to define a temporal logic programming language for reasoning about complex ac-
tions and infinite computations. DLTL extends propositional temporal logic of lin-
ear time with regular programs of propositional dynamic logic, which are used for
indexing temporal modalities. Allowing program expressions within temporal for-
mulas and including arbitrary temporal formulas in domain descriptions provides
a simple way of constraining the (possibly infinite) evolutions of a system, as in
Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL). To combine ASP and DLTL, we define a tem-
poral extension of ASP by allowing temporal modalities to occur within rules and
we introduce a notion of Temporal Answer Set, which captures the temporal dimen-
sion of the language as a linear structure and naturally allows to deal with infinite
computations. A domain description consists of two parts: a set of temporal rules
(action laws, causal laws, etc.) and a set of constraints (arbitrary DLTL formulas).
The temporal answer sets of the rules in the domain description which also satisfy
the constraints are defined to be the extensions of the domain description.
We provide a translation into standard ASP for the temporal rules of the do-
main description. The temporal answer sets of an action theory can then be com-
puted as the standard answer sets of the translation. To compute the extensions
of a domain description, the temporal constraints are evaluated over temporal
answer sets using bounded model checking techniques (Biere et al. 2003). The ap-
proach proposed for the verification of DLTL formulas extends the one developed in
(Heljanko and Niemela¨ 2003) for bounded LTL model checking with Stable Models.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we recall the temporal logic
DLTL. In Section 3, we introduce our action theory in temporal ASP. In Section 4,
we define the notions of temporal answer set and extension of a domain description.
Section 5 describes the reasoning tasks, while Sections 6 and 7 describe the model
checking problem and provide a translation of temporal domain descriptions into
ASP. Section 8 is devoted to conclusions and related work.
2 Dynamic Linear Time Temporal Logic
In this section we briefly define the syntax and semantics of DLTL as introduced
in (Henriksen and Thiagarajan 1999). In such a linear time temporal logic the next
state modality is indexed by actions. Moreover (and this is the extension to LTL),
the until operator Upi is indexed by a program π as in PDL. In addition to the usual
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✷ (always) and ✸ (eventually) temporal modalities of LTL, new modalities [π] and
〈π〉 are allowed. Informally, a formula [π]α is true in a world w of a linear temporal
model (a sequence of propositional interpretations) if α holds in all the worlds of
the model which are reachable from w through any execution of the program π. A
formula 〈π〉α is true in a world w of a linear temporal model if there exists a world
of the model reachable from w through an execution of the program π, in which
α holds. The program π can be any regular expression built from atomic actions
using sequence (;), nondeterministic choice (+) and finite iteration (∗). The usual
modalities ✷, ✸ and © (next) of LTL are definable.
Let Σ be a finite non-empty alphabet representing actions. Let Σ∗ and Σω be the
set of finite and infinite words on Σ, and let Σ∞ =Σ∗ ∪Σω. We denote by σ, σ′ the
words over Σω and by τ, τ ′ the words over Σ∗. For u ∈ Σ∞, we denote by prf(u)
the set of finite prefixes of u. Moreover, we denote by ≤ the usual prefix ordering
over Σ∗ namely, τ ≤ τ ′ iff ∃τ ′′ such that ττ ′′ = τ ′, and τ < τ ′ iff τ ≤ τ ′ and τ 6= τ ′.
The set of programs (regular expressions) Prg(Σ) generated by Σ is:
Prg(Σ) ::= a | π1 + π2 | π1;π2 | π
∗,
where a ∈ Σ and π1, π2, π range over Prg(Σ). A set of finite words is associated
with each program by the mapping [[]] : Prg(Σ)→ 2Σ
∗
, which is defined as follows:
• [[a]] = {a};
• [[π1 + π2]] = [[π1]] ∪ [[π2]];
• [[π1;π2]] = {τ1τ2 | τ1 ∈ [[π1]] and τ2 ∈ [[π2]]};
• [[π∗]] =
⋃
[[πi]], where
— [[π0]] = {ε}
— [[πi+1]] = {τ1τ2 | τ1 ∈ [[π]] and τ2 ∈ [[π
i]]}, for every i ∈ ω
where ε is the empty word (the empty action sequence).
Let P = {p1, p2, . . .} be a countable set of atomic propositions containing ⊤ and
⊥ (standing for true and false), and let DLTL(Σ) ::= p | ¬α | α∨ β | αUpiβ, where
p ∈ P and α, β range over DLTL(Σ).
A model of DLTL(Σ) is a pair M = (σ, V ) where σ ∈ Σω and V : prf(σ) → 2P
is a valuation function. Given a model M = (σ, V ), a finite word τ ∈ prf(σ) and a
formula α, the satisfiability of a formula α at τ in M , written M, τ |= α, is defined
as follows:
• M, τ |= ⊤;
• M, τ 6|= ⊥;
• M, τ |= p iff p ∈ V (τ);
• M, τ |= ¬α iff M, τ 6|= α;
• M, τ |= α ∨ β iff M, τ |= α or M, τ |= β;
• M, τ |= αUpiβ iff there exists τ ′ ∈ [[π]] such that ττ ′ ∈ prf(σ) andM, ττ ′ |= β.
Moreover, for every τ ′′ such that ε ≤ τ ′′ < τ ′, M, ττ ′′ |= α.
A formula α is satisfiable iff there is a modelM = (σ, V ) and a finite word τ ∈ prf(σ)
such that M, τ |= α. The formula αUpiβ is true at τ if “α until β” is true on a finite
stretch of behavior which is in the linear time behavior of the program π.
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The classical connectives⊃ and ∧ are defined as usual. The derived modalities 〈π〉
and [π] can be defined as follows: 〈π〉α ≡ ⊤Upiα and [π]α ≡ ¬〈π〉¬α. Furthermore, if
we let Σ = {a1, . . . , an}, the U (until), © (next), ✸ and ✷ operators of LTL can be
defined as follows: ©α ≡
∨
a∈Σ〈a〉α, αUβ ≡ αU
Σ∗β, ✸α ≡ ⊤Uα, ✷α ≡ ¬✸¬α,
where, in UΣ
∗
, Σ is taken to be a shorthand for the program a1 + . . .+ an. Hence,
LTL(Σ) is a fragment of DLTL(Σ). As shown in (Henriksen and Thiagarajan 1999),
DLTL(Σ) is strictly more expressive than LTL(Σ). In fact, DLTL has the full ex-
pressive power of the monadic second order theory of ω-sequences.
3 Action theories in Temporal ASP
Let P be a set of atomic propositions, the fluent names. A simple fluent literal l
is a fluent name f or its negation ¬f . Given a fluent literal l, such that l = f or
l = ¬f , we define |l| = f . We denote by LitS the set of all simple fluent literals and,
for each l ∈ LitS, we denote by l the complementary literal (namely, p = ¬p and
¬p = p). LitT is the set of temporal fluent literals: if l ∈ LitS, then [a]l,©l ∈ LitT
(for a ∈ Σ). Let Lit = LitS ∪ LitT ∪ {⊥}. Given a (temporal) fluent literal l, not l
represents the default negation of l. A (temporal) fluent literal, possibly preceded
by a default negation, will be called an extended fluent literal.
A state is a set of fluent literals in LitS. A state is consistent if it is not the case
that both f and ¬f belong to the state, or that ⊥ belongs to the state. A state is
complete if, for each fluent name p ∈ P , either p or ¬p belongs to it. The execution
of an action in a state may possibly change the values of fluents in the state through
its direct and indirect effects, thus giving rise to a new state.
Given a set of actions Σ, a domain description D over Σ is defined as a tuple
(Π, C), where Π is a set of laws (action laws, causal laws, precondition laws, etc.) de-
scribing the preconditions and effects of actions, and C is a set of DLTL constraints.
While Π contains the laws that are usually included in a domain description, which
define the executability conditions for actions, their direct and indirect effects as
well as conditions on the initial state, C contains general DLTL constraints which
must be satisfied by the intended interpretations of the domain description. While
the laws in Π define conditions on single states or on pairs of consecutive states,
DLTL constraints define more general conditions on possible sequences of states
and actions. Let us first describe the laws occurring in Π.
The action laws describe the immediate effects of actions. They have the form:
✷([a]l0 ← t1, . . . , tm, not tm+1, . . . , not tn) (1)
where l0 is a simple fluent literal and the ti’s are either simple fluent literals or
temporal fluent literals of the form [a]l. Its meaning is that executing action a in
a state in which the conditions t1, . . . , tm hold and conditions tm+1, . . . , tn do not
hold causes the effect l0 to hold. Observe that a temporal literal [a]l is true in a
state when the execution of action a in that state causes l to become true in the
next state. For instance, the following action laws describe the deterministic effect
of the actions shoot and load for the Russian Turkey problem:
✷([shoot]¬alive← loaded)
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✷[load]loaded
Non deterministic actions can be defined using default negation in the body of
action laws. In the example, after spinning the gun, it may be loaded or not:
✷([spin]loaded← not [spin]¬loaded)
✷([spin]¬loaded← not [spin]loaded)
Observe that, in this case, temporal fluent literals occur in the body of action laws.
Causal laws are intended to express “causal” dependencies among fluents. In Π
we allow two kinds of causal laws. Static causal laws have the form:
✷(l0 ← l1, . . . , lm, not lm+1, . . . , not ln) (2)
where the li’s are simple fluent literals. Their meaning is: if l1, . . . , lm hold in a state
and lm+1, . . . , ln do not hold in that state, than l0 is caused to hold in that state.
Dynamic causal laws have the form:
✷(©l0 ← t1, . . . , tm, not tm+1, . . . , not tn) (3)
where l0 is a simple fluent literal and the ti’s are either simple fluent literals or
temporal fluent literals of the form ©li. Their meaning is: if t1, . . . , tm hold and
tm+1, . . . , tn do not hold in a state, then l0 is caused to hold in the next state.
Observe that ti =©li holds in a state when li holds in the next state.
For instance, the static causal law ✷(frightened ← in sight, alive) states that
the turkey being in sight of the hunter causes it to be frightened, if it is alive; alter-
natively, the dynamic causal law ✷(©frightened ← ©in sight,¬in sight, alive)
states that if the turkey is alive, it becomes frightened (if it is not already) when
it starts seeing the hunter; but it can possibly become non-frightened later, due to
other events, while still being in sight of the hunter1.
Besides action laws and causal laws, that apply to all states, we also allow for
laws in Π that only apply to the initial state. They are called initial state laws
and have the form:
l0 ← l1, . . . , lm, not lm+1, . . . , not ln (4)
where the li’s are simple fluent literals. Observe that initial state laws, unlike static
causal laws, only apply to the initial state as they are not prefixed by the ✷modality.
As a special case, the initial state can be defined as a set of simple fluent literals. For
instance, the initial state {alive,¬in sight,¬frightened} is defined by the initial
state laws:
alive ¬in sight ¬frightened
Given the laws introduced above, all the usual ingredients of action theories can
be introduced in Π. In particular, let us consider the case when ⊥ can occur as a
literal in the head of those laws.
1 Shorthands like those in (Denecker et al. 1998) could be used, even though we do not introduce
them in this paper, to express that a fluent or a complex formula is initiated (i.e., it is false in
the current state and caused true in the next one).
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Precondition laws are special kinds of action laws (1) with ⊥ as effect. They
have the form:
✷([a] ⊥← l1, . . . , lm, not lm+1, . . . , not ln)
where a ∈ Σ and the li’s are simple fluent literals. The meaning is that the execution
of an action a is not possible in a state in which l1, . . . , lm hold and lm+1, . . . , ln do
not hold (that is, no state may result from the execution of a in a state in which
l1, . . . , lm hold and lm+1, . . . , ln do not hold).
State constraints that apply to the initial state or to all states can be obtained
when ⊥ occurs in the head of initial state laws (4) or static causal laws (2):
⊥ ← l1, . . . , lm, not lm+1, . . . , not ln
✷(⊥ ← l1, . . . , lm, not lm+1, . . . , not ln)
The first one means that it is not the case that, in the initial state, l1, . . . , lm hold
and lm+1, . . . , ln do not hold. The second one means that there is no state in which
l1, . . . , lm hold and lm+1, . . . , ln do not hold.
As in (Lifschitz 1990) we call frame fluents those fluents to which the law of
inertia applies. The persistency of frame fluents from a state to the next one can
be enforced by introducing in Π a set of laws, called persistency laws,
✷(©f ← f, not©¬f)
✷(©¬f ← ¬f, not© f)
for each simple fluent f to which inertia applies. Their meaning is that, if f holds
in a state, then f will hold in the next state, unless its complement ¬f is caused
to hold. And similarly for ¬f . Note that persistency laws are instances of dynamic
causal laws (3). In the following, we use inertial f as a shorthand for the persistency
laws for f .
The persistency of a fluent from a state to the next one is blocked by the execution
of an action which causes the value of the fluent to change, or by a nondeterministic
action which may cause it to change. For instance, the persistency of ¬loaded is
blocked by load and by spin.
Examples of non-inertial fluents, for which persistency laws are not included, are
those taking a default truth value, as for a spring door which is normally closed:
✷(closed← not¬closed)
or those which always change, at least by default, e.g., in case of a pendulum (see
(Giunchiglia et al. 2004)) always switching between left and right position:
✷(©right← ¬right, not©¬right)
✷(©¬right← right, not© right)
Such default action laws play a role similar to that of inertia rules in C (Giunchiglia and Lifschitz 1998),
C+ (Giunchiglia et al. 2004) and K (Eiter et al. 2004).
Initial state laws may incompletely specify the initial state. In this paper we
want to reason about complete states so that the execution of an infinite sequence
of actions gives rise to a linear model as defined in section 2. For this reason, we
assume that, for each fluent f , Π contains the laws:
Theory and Practice of Logic Programming 7
f ← not ¬f
¬f ← not f
As we will see later, this assumption in general is not sufficient to guarantee that
all the states are complete.
Test actions, useful for checking the value of a fluent in a state in the definition
of complex actions, can be defined through suitable laws as follows. Given a simple
fluent literal l ∈ LitS, the test action l? is executable only if l holds, and it has no
effect on any fluent f :
✷([l?]⊥ ← not l)
✷([l?]f ← f)
✷([l?]¬f ← ¬f)
The second component of a domain description is the set C of DLTL con-
straints, which allow very general temporal conditions to be imposed on the ex-
ecutions of the domain description (we will call them extensions). Their effect is
that of restricting the space of the possible executions. For instance, the constraint:
¬loaded U in sight
states that the gun is not loaded until the turkey is in sight. Its addition filters out
all the executions in which the gun is loaded before the turkey is in sight.
A temporal constraint can also require a complex behavior to be performed. The
program
(¬in sight?;wait)∗; in sight?; load; shoot (5)
describes the behavior of the hunter who waits for a turkey until it appears and,
when it is in sight, loads the gun and shoots. Actions in sight? and ¬in sight? are
test actions, as introduced before. If the constraint
〈(¬in sight?;wait)∗; in sight?; load; shoot〉⊤
is included in C then all the runs of the domain description which do not start with
an execution of the given program will be filtered out. For instance, an extension in
which in the initial state the turkey is not in sight and the hunter loads the gun and
shoots is not allowed. In general, the inclusion of a constraint 〈π〉⊤ in C requires
that there is an execution of the program π starting from the initial state.
Example 1
Let us consider a variant of the Yale shooting problem including some of the laws
above, and some more stating that: if the hunter is in sight and the turkey is alive,
the turkey is frightened; the turkey may come in sight or out of sight (nondeter-
ministically) during waiting.
Let Σ = {load, shoot, spin, wait} and P = {alive, loaded, in sight, frightened}.
We define a domain description (Π,C), where Π contains the following laws:
Immediate effects:
✷([shoot]¬alive← loaded) ✷[load]loaded
✷([spin]loaded← not[spin]¬loaded) ✷([spin]¬loaded← not[spin]loaded)
✷([wait]in sight← not[wait]¬in sight) ✷([wait]¬in sight← not[wait]in sight)
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Causal laws: ✷(frightened← in sight, alive)
Initial state laws: alive ¬in sight ¬frightened
Precondition laws: ✷([load] ⊥← loaded)
All fluents in P are inertial: inertial alive, inertial loaded, inertial in sight, in-
ertial frightened; and C = {¬loaded U in sight}.
Given this domain description we may want to ask if it is possible for the hunter
to execute a behavior described by program π in (5) so that the turkey is not alive
after that execution. The intended answer to the query 〈π〉¬alive would be yes,
since there is a possible scenario in which this can happen.
Example 2
In order to see that the action theory in this paper is well suited to deal with infinite
executions, consider a mail delivery agent, which repeatedly checks if there is mail
in the mailboxes of a and b and then it delivers the mail to a or to b, if there is
any; otherwise, it waits. Then, the agent starts again the cycle. The actions in Σ
are: begin, sense mail(a) (the agent verifies if there is mail in the mailbox of a),
sense mail(b), deliver(a) (the agent delivers the mail to a), deliver(b), wait (the
agent waits). The fluent names are mail(a) (there is mail in the mailbox of a) and
mail(b). The domain description contains the following laws for a:
Immediate effects:
✷[deliver(a)]¬mail(a)
✷([sense mail(a)]mail(a)← not [sense mail(a)]¬mail(a))
Precondition laws:
✷([deliver(a)] ⊥← ¬mail(a))
✷([wait] ⊥←mail(a))
Their meaning is (in the order) that: after delivering mail to a, there is no mail
for a anymore; the action sense mail(a) of verifying if there is mail for a, may
(non-monotonically) cause mail(a) to become true; in case there is no mail for a,
deliver(a) is not executable; in case there is mail for a, wait is not executable. The
same laws are also introduced for the actions involving b.
All fluents in P are inertial: inertial mail(a), inertial mail(b). Observe that, the
persistency laws for inertial fluents interact with the immediate effect laws above.
The execution of sense mail(a) in a state in which there is no mail for a (¬mail(a)),
may either lead to a state in which mail(a) holds (by the second action law) or to
a state in which ¬mail(a) holds (by the persistency of ¬mail(a)).
C contains the following constraints:
〈begin〉⊤
✷[begin]〈sense(a); sense(b); (deliver(a) + deliver(b) + wait); begin〉⊤
The first one means that the action begin must be executed in the initial state. The
second one means that, after any execution of action begin, the agent must execute
sense(a) and sense(b) in the order, then either deliver the mail to a or to b or wait
and, then, execute action begin again, to start a new cycle.
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We may want to check that if there is mail for b, the agent will eventually de-
liver it to b. This property, which can be formalized by the formula ✷(mail(b) ⊃
✸¬mail(b)), does not hold as there is a possible scenario in which there is mail for
b, but the mail is repeatedly delivered to a and never to b. The mail delivery agent
we have described is not fair.
Example 3
As an example of modeling a controlled system and its possible faults, we describe
an adaptation of the qualitative causal model of the “common rail” diesel injection
system from (Panati and Theseider Dupre´ 2001) where:
• Pressurized fuel is stored in a container, the rail, in order to be injected at high
pressure into the cylinders. We ignore in the model the output flow through
the injectors. Fuel from the tank is input to the rail through a pump.
• A regulating system, including, in the physical system, a pressure sensor, a
pressure regulator and an Electronic Control Unit, controls pressure in the
rail; in particular, the pressure regulator, commanded by the ECU based on
the measured pressure, outputs fuel back to the tank.
• The control system repeatedly executes the sense p (sense pressure) action
while the physical system evolves through internal events.
Examples of formulas from the model are contained in Π:
✷([pump weak fault]f in low)
shows the effect of the fault event pump weak fault. Flows influence the derivative
of the pressure in the rail, and the pressure derivative influences pressure via the
event p change:
✷(p decr ← f out ok, f in low) ✷(p incr ← f out very low, f in low)
✷(p steady← f out low, f in low) ✷([p change]p low ← p ok, p decr)
✷([p change]p ok ← p low, p incr) ✷([p change]⊥ ← p steady)
✷([p change]⊥ ← p decr, p low) ✷([p change]⊥ ← p incr, p ok)
The model of the pressure regulating subsystem includes:
✷([sense p]p obs ok ← p ok) ✷(f out ok ← normal mode, p obs ok)
✷([sense p]p obs low ← p low) ✷(f out low ← comp mode, p obs ok)
✷([switch mode]comp mode) ✷(f out very low ← comp mode, p obs low)
with the obvious mutual exclusion constraints among fluents. Initially, everything
is normal and pressure is steady: p ok, p steady, f in ok, f out ok, normal mode.
All fluents are inertial. We have the following temporal constraints in C:
✷((p ok ∧ p decr) ∨ (p low ∧ p incr) ⊃ 〈p change〉⊤)
✷(normal mode ∧ p obs low ⊃ 〈switch mode〉⊤)
[sense p]〈(Σ− {sense p})∗〉〈sense p〉⊤
✷[pump weak fault]¬✸〈pump weak fault〉⊤
The first one models conditions which imply a pressure change. The second one
models the fact that a mode switch occurs when the system is operating in normal
mode and the measured pressure is low. The third one models the fact that the
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control system repeatedly executes sense p, but other actions may occur in between.
The fourth one imposes that at most one fault may occur in a run.
Given this specification we can, for instance, check that if pressure is low in one
state, it will be normal in the third next one, namely, that the temporal formula
✷(p low ⊃ ©©©p ok) is satisfied in all the possible scenarios admitted by the
domain description. That is, the system tolerates a weak fault of the pump — the
only fault included in this model. In general, we could, e.g., be interested in proving
properties that hold if at most one fault occurs, or at most one fault in a set of
“weak” faults occurs.
As we have seen from the examples, our formalism allows naturally to deal with
infinite executions of actions. Such infinite executions define the models over which
temporal formulas can be evaluated. In order to deal with cases (e.g., in planning)
where we want to reason on finite action sequences, it is easy to see that any finite
action sequence can be represented as an infinite one, adding to the domain descrip-
tion an action dummy, and the constraints ✸〈dummy〉⊤ and ✷[dummy]〈dummy〉⊤
stating that action dummy is eventually executed and, from that point on, only the
action dummy is executed. In the following, we will restrict our attention to infinite
executions, assuming that the dummy action is introduced when needed.
4 Temporal answer sets and extensions for domain descriptions
Given a domain description D = (Π, C), the laws in Π are rules of a general logic
program extended with a restricted use of temporal modalities. In order to define
the extensions of a domain description, we introduce a notion of temporal answer
set, extending the usual notion of answer set (Gelfond 2007). The extensions of a
domain description will then be defined as the temporal answer sets of Π satisfying
the integrity constraints C.
In the following, for conciseness, we call “simple (temporal) literals” the “simple
(temporal) fluent literals”. We call rules the laws in Π, having one of the two forms:
l0 ← l1, . . . , lm, not lm+1, . . . , not ln (6)
where the l′i’s are simple literals, and
✷(t0 ← t1, . . . , tm, not tm+1, . . . , not tn) (7)
where the ti’s are simple or temporal literals, the first one capturing initial state
laws, the second one all the other laws. To define the notion of extension, we also
need to introduce rules of the form: [a1; . . . ; ah](t0 ← t1, . . . , tm, not tm+1, . . . , not tn),
where the ti’s are simple or temporal literals, which will be used to define the reduct
of a program. The modality [a1; . . . ; ah] means that the rule applies in the state
obtained after the execution of actions a1, . . . , ah. Conveniently, also the notion of
temporal literal used so far needs to be extended to include literals of the form
[a1; . . . ; ah]l, meaning that l holds after the action sequence a1, . . . , ah.
As we have seen, temporal models of DLTL are linear models, consisting of an
action sequence σ and a valuation function V , associating a propositional evaluation
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with each state in the sequence (denoted by a prefix of σ). We extend the notion of
answer set to capture this linear structure of temporal models, by defining a partial
temporal interpretation as a pair (σ, S), where σ ∈ Σω and S is a set of literals of
the form [a1; . . . ; ak]l, where a1 . . . ak is a prefix of σ.
Definition 1
Let σ ∈ Σω. A partial temporal interpretation over σ is a pair (σ, S) where S is a
set of temporal literals of the form [a1; . . . ; ak]l, such that a1 . . . ak is a prefix of σ,
and it is not the case that both [a1; . . . ; ak]l and [a1; . . . ; ak]¬l belong to S or that
[a1; . . . ; ak]⊥ belongs to S (namely, S is a consistent set of temporal literals).
A temporal interpretation (σ, S) is said to be total if either [a1; . . . ; ak]p ∈ S or
[a1; . . . ; ak]¬p ∈ S, for each a1 . . . ak prefix of σ and for each fluent name p.
Observe that a partial interpretation (σ, S) provides, for each prefix a1 . . . ak, a
partial evaluation of fluents in the state corresponding to that prefix. The (partial)
state w
(σ,S)
a1...ak obtained by the execution of the actions a1 . . . ak in the sequence can
be defined as follows:
w(σ,S)a1...ak = {l : [a1; . . . ; ak]l ∈ S}
Given a partial temporal interpretation (σ, S) and a prefix a1 . . . ak of σ, we define
the satisfiability of a simple, temporal and extended literal t in (σ, S) at a1 . . . ak
(written (σ, S), a1 . . . ak |= t) as follows:
(σ, S), a1 . . . ak |= ⊤
(σ, S), a1 . . . ak 6|= ⊥
(σ, S), a1 . . . ak |= l iff [a1; . . . ; ak]l ∈ S, for a simple literal l
(σ, S), a1 . . . ak |= [a]l iff [a1; . . . ; ak; a]l ∈ S or a1 . . . ak, a is not a prefix of σ
(σ, S), a1 . . . ak |=©l iff [a1; . . . ; ak; b]l ∈ S, where a1 . . . akb is a prefix of σ
(σ, S), a1 . . . ak |= not l iff (σ, S), a1 . . . ak 6|= l
The satisfiability of rule bodies in a partial interpretation is defined as usual:
(σ, S), a1 . . . ak |= t1, . . . , tn iff (σ, S), a1 . . . ak |= ti for i = 1, . . . , n.
A ruleH ← Body is satisfied in a partial temporal interpretation (σ, S) if, (σ, S), ε |=
Body implies (σ, S), ε |= H , where ε is the empty action sequence.
A rule ✷(H ← Body) is satisfied in a partial temporal interpretation (σ, S) if,
for all action sequences a1 . . . ak (including the empty one), (σ, S), a1 . . . ak |= Body
implies (σ, S), a1 . . . ak |= H .
A rule [a1; . . . ; ah](H ← Body) is satisfied in a partial temporal interpretation
(σ, S) if (σ, S), a1 . . . ah |= Body implies (σ, S), a1 . . . ah |= H .
We are now ready to define the notion of answer set for a set P of rules that does
not contain default negation. Let P be a set of rules over an action alphabet Σ, not
containing default negation, and let σ ∈ Σω.
Definition 2
A partial temporal interpretation (σ, S) is a temporal answer set of P if S is min-
imal (in the sense of set inclusion) among the S′ such that (σ, S′) is a partial
interpretation satisfying the rules in P .
In order to define answer sets of a programP possibly containing negation, given a
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partial temporal interpretation (σ, S) over σ ∈ Σω, we define the reduct, P (σ,S), of P
relative to (σ, S) extending Gelfond and Lifschitz’ transform (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988)
to compute a different reduct of P for each prefix a1, . . . , ah of σ.
Definition 3
The reduct, P
(σ,S)
a1,...,ah , of P relative to (σ, S) and to the prefix a1, . . . , ah of σ is the
set of all the rules
[a1; . . . ; ah](H ← t1, . . . , tm)
such that ✷(H ← t1, . . . , tm, not tm+1, . . . , not tn) is in P and (σ, S), a1, . . . , ah 6|=
ti, for all i = m+ 1, . . . , n. The reduct P
(σ,S) of P relative to (σ, S) is the union of
all reducts P
(σ,S)
a1,...,ah for all prefixes a1, . . . , ah of σ.
In essence, given (σ, S), a different reduct is defined for each finite prefix of σ,
i.e., for each possible state corresponding to a prefix of σ.
Definition 4
A partial temporal interpretation (σ, S) is a temporal answer set of P if (σ, S) is a
temporal answer set of the reduct P (σ,S).
The definition above is a natural generalization of the usual notion of answer set
to programs with temporal rules. Observe that σ has infinitely many prefixes, so
that the reduct P (σ,S) is infinite as well as its answer sets. This is in accordance
with the fact that temporal models are infinite.
In the following, we will devote our attention to those domain descriptions D =
(Π, C) such that Π has total temporal answer sets. We will call such domain de-
scriptions well-defined domain descriptions. As we will see below, total temporal
answer sets can indeed be regarded as temporal models (according to the defini-
tion of model in Section 2). Although it is not possible to define general syntactic
conditions which guarantee that the temporal answer sets of Π are total, this can
be done in some specific case. It is possible to prove the following:
Proposition 1
Let D = (Π, C) be a domain description over Σ, such that all fluents are inertial.
Let σ ∈ Σω. Any answer set of Π over σ is a total answer set over σ.
This result is not surprising, since, as we have assumed in the previous section, the
laws for completing the initial state are implicitly added to Π, so that the initial
state is complete. Moreover, it can be shown that (under the conditions, stated in
Proposition 1, that all fluents are inertial) the execution of an action in a com-
plete state produces (nondeterministically, due to the presence of nondeterministic
actions) a new complete state, which can be only determined by the action laws,
causal laws and persistency laws executed in that state.
In the following, we define the notion of extension of a well-defined domain de-
scription D = (Π, C) over Σ in two steps: first, we find the temporal answer sets
of Π; second, we filter out all the temporal answer sets which do not satisfy the
temporal constraints in C. For the second step, we need to define when a temporal
formula α is satisfied in a total temporal interpretation (σ, S). Observe that a total
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answer set (σ, S) can be easily seen as a temporal model, as defined in Section
2. Given a total answer set (σ, S) we define the corresponding temporal model as
MS = (σ, VS), where p ∈ VS(a1, . . . , ah) if and only if [a1; . . . ; ah]p ∈ S, for all
atomic propositions p. We say that a total answer set S over σ satisfies a DLTL
formula α if MS , ε |= α.
Definition 5
An extension of a well-defined domain domain description D = (Π, C) over Σ is a
(total) answer set (σ, S) of Π which satisfies the constraints in C.
Notice that, in general, a domain description may have more than one extension
even for the same action sequence σ: the different extensions of D with the same σ
account for the different possible initial states (when the initial state is incompletely
specified) as well as for the different possible effects of nondeterministic actions.
Example 4
Assume the dummy action is added to the Russian Turkey domain in Section 3.
Given the infinite sequence σ1 = ¬in sight?;wait; in sight?; load; shoot; dummy; . . .,
the domain description has (among the others) an extension (σ1, S1) over σ1 con-
taining the following temporal literals (for the sake of brevity, we write [a1; . . . ; an](l1∧
. . . ∧ lk) to mean that [a1; . . . ; an]li holds in S1 for all i’s):
[ε](alive ∧ ¬in sight ∧ ¬frightened ∧ ¬loaded),
[¬in sight?](alive ∧ ¬in sight ∧ ¬frightened ∧ ¬loaded),
[¬in sight?; wait](alive ∧ in sight ∧ frightened ∧ ¬loaded),
[¬in sight?;wait; in sight?](alive∧ in sight ∧ frightened ∧ ¬loaded),
[¬in sight?;wait; in sight?; load](alive∧ in sight ∧ frightened ∧ loaded),
[¬in sight?;wait; in sight?; load; shoot](¬alive∧ in sight ∧ frightened ∧ loaded),
[¬in sight?;wait; in sight?; load; shoot; dummy](¬alive ∧ in sight ∧ frightened ∧
loaded)
and so on. This extension satisfies the constraints in the domain description and
corresponds to a linear temporal model MS1 = (σ1, VS).
To conclude this section we would like to point out that, given a domain descrip-
tion D = (Π, C) over Σ such that Π only admits total answer sets, a transition
system (W, I, T ) can be associated with Π, as follows:
- W is the set of all the possible consistent and complete states of the domain
description;
- I is the set of all the states in W satisfying the initial state laws in Π;
- T ⊆W ×Σ×W is the set of all triples (w, a, w′) such that: w,w′ ∈W , a ∈ Σ
and for some total answer set (σ, S) of Π: w = w
(σ,S)
[a1;...;ah]
and w′ = w
(σ,S)
[a1;...;ah;a]
Intuitively, T is the set of transitions between states. A transition labelled a from
w to w′ (represented by the triple (w, a, w′)) is present in T if, there is a (total)
answer set of Π, in which w is a state and the execution of action a in w leads to
the state w′.
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5 Reasoning tasks
Given a domain description D = (Π, C) over Σ and a temporal goal α (a DLTL
formula), we are interested in finding out the extensions of D = (Π, C) satisfy-
ing/falsifying α. While in the next section we will focus on the use of bounded
model checking techniques for answering this question, in this one we show that
many reasoning problems, including temporal projection, planning and diagnosis
can be characterized in this way.
Suppose that in Example 1 we want to know if there is a scenario in which the
turkey is not alive after the action sequence ¬in sight?, wait; in sight?, load, shoot.
We can solve this temporal projection problem by finding out an extension of the
domain description which satisfies the temporal formula
〈¬in sight?;wait; in sight?; load; shoot〉¬alive
The extension S1 in Example 4 indeed satisfies the temporal formula above, since
〈¬in sight?;wait; in sight?; load; shoot〉¬alive is true in the linear model MS1 =
(σ1, VS) associated with the extension S1.
It is well known that a planning problem can be formulated as a satisfiability
problem (Giunchiglia and Traverso 1999). In case of complete state and determin-
istic actions, the problem of finding a plan which makes the turkey not alive and
the gun loaded, can be stated as the problem of finding out an extension of the do-
main description in which the formula ✸(¬alive∧loaded) is satisfied. The extension
provides a plan for achieving the goal ¬alive ∧ loaded.
With an incomplete initial state, or with nondeterministic actions, the problem
of finding a conformant/universal plan which works for all the possible completions
of the initial state and for all the possible outcomes of nondeterministic actions
cannot be simply solved by checking the satisfiability of the formula above. The
computed plan must also be tested to be a conformant plan. On the one hand,
it must be verified that the computed plan π always achieves the given Goal, i.e.,
there is no extension of the domain description satisfying the formula 〈π〉¬Goal. On
the other hand, it must be verified that π is executable in all initial states. This can
be done, for instance, adopting techniques similar to those in (Giunchiglia 2000).
(Eiter et al. 2003) addresses the problem of conformant planning in the DLVK sys-
tem. (Tu et al. 2011) develops conformant planners based on a notion of approxi-
mation of action theories in the action language AL (Baral and Gelfond 2000).
As concerns diagnosis, consider systems like the one in Example 3. A diag-
nosis of a fault observation obsf is a run from the initial state to a state in
which obsf holds and which does not contain fault observations in the previous
states (Panati and Theseider Dupre´ 2000), i.e., an extension satisfying the formula:
(¬obs1 ∧ . . .∧¬obsn) U obsf , where obs1, . . . , obsn are all the possible observations
of fault. In Example 3, p obs low is the only possible fault observation, hence a di-
agnosis for it is an extension of the domain description which satisfies ✸p obs low.
As concerns property verification, an example has been given in Example 2.
We observe that the verification that a domain description D is well-defined can
be done by adding to the domain description a static law ✷(undefined fluent←
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not f∧not ¬f), for each fluent literal f , and by verifying that there are no extensions
in which ✸undefined fluent holds in the initial state.
Other reasoning tasks which can be addressed by checking the satisfiability or
validity of formulas in a temporal action theory are multiagent protocol verification
(Giordano et al. 2007), and verification of the compliance of business processes to
norms (D’Aprile et al. 2010).
6 Model checking and bounded model checking
LTL is widely used to prove properties of systems by means of model checking. The
property to be verified can be represented as an LTL formula ϕ, whereas a Kripke
structure provides the model of the system to be verified (in the current case, the
transition system associated with the domain description). A standard approach to
verification is based on the construction of the Bu¨chi automaton for the negated
property and on the computation of the product of such automaton with the model
of the system. The property is verified when the language accepted by the product
automaton is empty, whereas any infinite word accepted by the product automaton
provides a counterexample to the validity of ϕ. This approach is also feasible for
DLTL, as it is possible to construct a Bu¨chi automaton for a given DLTL formula
(Henriksen and Thiagarajan 1999). In particular, as for LTL, the construction of
the automaton can be done on-the-fly, while checking for the emptiness of the
language accepted by the automaton (Giordano and Martelli 2006).
In (Biere et al. 2003) it has been shown that, in some cases, model checking can
be more efficient if, instead of building the product automaton and checking for
an accepting run on it, we build only an accepting run of the automaton (if there
is one). This technique is called bounded model checking (BMC), since it looks for
paths whose length is bounded by some integer k, by iteratively increasing the
length k until a run satisfying ¬ϕ is found (if one exists). The paths considered are
infinite paths which can be finitely represented as paths of length k with a back
loop from state k to a previous state in the path: it can be shown that, if a Bu¨chi
automaton has an accepting run, it has one which can be represented in this way.
A BMC problem can be efficiently reduced to a propositional satisfiability prob-
lem (Biere et al. 2003) or to an ASP problem (Heljanko and Niemela¨ 2003). BMC
provides a partial decision procedure for checking validity: if no model exists, the
iterative procedure will never stop. Techniques for achieving completeness are de-
scribed in (Biere et al. 2003).
In the next section, we address the problem of defining a translation of a domain
description into standard ASP, so that bounded model checking techniques can be
used to check if a temporal goal (a DLTL formula) is satisfiable in some extension
of the domain description. The approach we propose for the verification of DLTL
formulas extends the one developed in (Heljanko and Niemela¨ 2003) for bounded
LTL model checking with Stable Models.
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7 Translation to ASP
In this section, we show how to translate a domain description to standard ASP.
A temporal model consists of an infinite sequence of actions and a valuation
function giving the value of fluents in the states of the model. States are represented
in ASP as integers, starting with the initial state 0. We will use the predicates
occurs(Action, State) and holds(Literal, State). Occurrence of exactly one action
in each state must be encoded:
¬occurs(A,S)← occurs(A1, S), action(A), action(A1), A 6= A1, state(S).
occurs(A,S)← not ¬occurs(A,S), action(A), state(S).
Given a domain description (Π, C), the rules in Π can be translated as follows.
Action laws ✷([a](¬)f0 ← t1, . . . , tm, not tm+1, . . . , not tn) are translated to
(¬)holds(f0, S
′)← state(S), S′ = S+1, occurs(a, S), h1 . . . hm, not hm+1 . . . not hn
where hi = (¬)holds((fi, S
′) if ti = [a](¬)fi and hi = (¬)holds(fi, S) if ti = (¬)fi.
Dynamic causal laws ✷(©(¬)f0 ← t1, . . . , tm, not tm+1, . . . , not tn) are translated
to
(¬)holds(f0, S
′)← state(S), S′ = S + 1, h1 . . . hm, not hm+1 . . . not hn
where hi = (¬)holds(fi, S
′) if ti =©(¬)fi and hi = (¬)holds(fi, S) if ti = (¬)fi.
Static causal laws (2) are translated in a similar way (replacing S′ with S in the
head), while initial state laws are evaluated in state 0.
Precondition laws ✷([a] ⊥← l1, . . . , lm, not lm+1, . . . , not ln) are translated to ASP
constraints
← state(S), occurs(a, S), h1 . . . hm, not hm+1 . . . not hn
where hi = holds(li, S).
As described in the previous section, we are interested in infinite models repre-
sented as k-loops, i.e., finite sequences of states from 0 to k with a back loop from
state k to a previous state. Thus, we assume a bound k on the number of states.
The above rules compute a finite model from state 0 to state k+1. To detect the
loop, we must find a state j, 0 ≤ j ≤ k, equal to state k + 1 This can be achieved
by defining a predicate eq last(S) to check if state S ie equal to state k + 1, and a
predicate next(S1, S2) such that next(i, i+ 1) for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, and next(k, j).
diff last(S)← state(S), S <= k, f luent(F ), holds(F, S),¬holds(F, k + 1).
diff last(S) : −state(S), S <= k, f luent(F ), holds(F, k + 1),¬holds(F, S).
eq last(S) : −state(S), S <= k, not diff last(S).
next(S, SN)← state(S), S < k, SN = S + 1.
¬next(k, S)← next(k, SS), state(S), state(SS), S 6= SS.
next(k, S)← state(S), S <= k, not ¬next(k, S).
← next(k, S), not eq last(S).
The second and third rule for next impose that is exactly one state next to state
k; the last constraint imposes that such a state is equal to state k + 1.
Given a domain description (Π, C), we denote by tr(Π) the set of rules containing
the translation of each law in Π as well as the definitions of eq,diff and next, as
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defined above. Observe that an answer set R of tr(Π) such that, for each state
i = 1, . . . , k, either holds(p, i) ∈ R or ¬holds(p, i) ∈ R, represents a temporal
model as a k-loop. The temporal model, MR = (σR, VR) associated with R can be
defined as follows:
σR = a1a2 . . . ajaj+1 . . . ak+1aj+1 . . . ak+1 . . .
where occurs(a1, 0), occurs(a2, 1), ..., occurs(aj+1, j), ..., occurs(ak+1, k), next(k, j)
(i.e., ak+1 leads back to state j) belong to R, and, for all atomic propositions p ∈ P :
p ∈ VR(ε) if and only if holds(p, 0) ∈ R
p ∈ VR(a1 . . . ah) if and only if holds(p, h) ∈ R, for 0 < h ≤ k
p ∈ VR(a1 . . . ak+1) if and only if holds(p, j) ∈ R.
We can show that there is a one to one correspondence between the temporal
answer sets of Π and the answer sets of the translation tr(Π). Let (Π, C) be a
well-defined domain description over Σ.
Theorem 1
(1) Given a temporal answer set (σ, S) of Π such that σ can be finitely represented
as a finite path with a k-loop, there is a consistent answer set R of tr(Π) such
that R and S correspond to the same temporal model.
(2) Given a consistent answer set R of tr(Π), there is a temporal answer set (σ, S)
of Π (that can be finitely represented as a finite path with a back loop) such
that R and S correspond to the same temporal model.
We refer to Appendix A for the proof.
Let us now come to the problem of evaluating a DLTL formula over the models
associated with the answer sets of tr(Π). To deal with DLTL formulas, we use the
predicate sat(alpha, S), to express satisfiability of a DLTL formula α in a state
of a model. As in (Giordano and Martelli 2006) we assume that until formulas
are indexed with finite automata rather than regular expressions, by exploiting
the equivalence between regular expressions and finite automata. Thus, we have
αUA(q)β instead of αUpiβ, where L(A(q)) = [[π]]. More precisely, let A = (Q, δ,QF )
be an ǫ-free nondeterministic finite automaton over the alphabet Σ without an
initial state, where Q is a finite set of states, δ : Q × Σ → 2Q is the transition
function, and QF is the set of final states. Given a state q ∈ Q, we denote with
A(q) an automaton A with initial state q. In the definition of predicate sat for until
formulas, we refer to the following axioms (Henriksen and Thiagarajan 1999):
αUA(q)β ≡ (β ∨ (α ∧
∨
a∈Σ〈a〉
∨
q′∈δ(q,a) αU
A(q′)β)) (q is a final state of A)
αUA(q)β ≡ (α ∧
∨
a∈Σ〈a〉
∨
q′∈δ(q,a) αU
A(q′)β) (q is not a final state of A)
In the translation to ASP, DLTL formulas will be represented with terms. In par-
ticular, the formula αUA(q)β will be represented as until(A, q, alpha, beta). Further-
more, we assume the automaton A to be described with the predicates trans(A,Q1,
Act,Q2) defining the transitions, and final(A,Q) defining the final states. The def-
inition of sat is the following:
fluent: sat(F, S)← fluent(F ), holds(F, S).
or: sat(or(Alpha,Beta), S)← sat(Alpha, S).
sat(or(Alpha,Beta), S)← sat(Beta, S).
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neg: sat(neg(Alpha), S)← not sat(Alpha, S).
until: sat(until(Aut,Q,Alpha,Beta), S)← final(Aut,Q), sat(Beta, S).
sat(until(Aut,Q,Alpha,Beta), S)←
sat(Alpha, S), trans(Aut,Q,Act,Q1), occurs(Act, S),
next(S, S1), sat(until(Aut,Q1, Alpha,Beta), S1).
Similar definitions can be given for derived connectives and modalities. For instance,
the temporal formulas ✸α, 〈a〉α and [a]α are represented, respectively, by the terms
eventually(t alpha), diamond(a, t alpha) and box(a, t alpha), where t alpha is the
term encoding the formula α. The definition of sat for such formulas is the following:
eventually: sat(eventually(Alpha), S)← sat(Alpha, S).
eventually: sat(eventually(Alpha), S)← next(S, S1), sat(eventually(Alpha), S1).
〈a〉: sat(diamond(A,Alpha), S)← occurs(A,S), next(S, S1), sat(Alpha, S1).
[a]: sat(box(A,Alpha), S)← action(A), occurs(B,S), A! = B.
[a]: sat(box(A,Alpha), S)← occurs(A,S), next(S, S1), sat(Alpha, S1).
Since states are complete, we can identify default negation with classical negation,
thus having a two valued interpretation of DLTL formulas. We must also add a
constraint ← not sat(t alpha, 0), for each temporal constraint α in the domain
description, where states are represented by numbers, 0 is the initial state and
t alpha is the term encoding the formula α. The presence of the constraint ←
not sat(t alpha, 0), in the translation of the domain description guarantees that α
must be satisfied, as the negated formula not sat(t alpha, 0) is not allowed to be
true in the answer set.
As an example, the encoding of the temporal constraint
✷[begin]〈sense(a); sense(b); (deliver(a) + deliver(b) + wait); begin〉⊤
in Example 2, is given by the following rules:
← not sat(neg(ev(neg(box(begin, until(aut, q1, true, true))))), 0).
trans(aut, q1, sense(a), q2).
trans(aut, q2, sense(b), q3).
trans(aut, q3, deliver(a), q4).
trans(aut, q3, deliver(b), q4).
trans(aut, q3, wait, q4).
trans(aut, q4, begin, q5).
f inal(aut, q5).
The first rule encodes the constraint, while the following ones encode the definition
of the automaton aut, which is equivalent to the regular expression indexing the
until formula in the constraint.
It is easy to see that the computation of the satisfiability of a formula α in a
given state depends only on a finite set of formulas consisting of the subformulas
of α and the formulas derived from an until subformula. We say that a formula
γUA(q
′)β is derived from a formula γUA(q)β if q′ is reachable from q in A.
It is possible to see that the definition of the predicate sat, as given above for
the base cases (fluent, or, neg, until), provides a correct evaluation of the temporal
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formulas over the temporal models associated with the translation tr(Π) of Π. Let
tr′(Π) be the set of rules extending the rules in tr(Π) with the definition of predicate
sat above. Let (Π, C) be a well-defined domain description over Σ. We can prove
the following theorem (the proof can be found in Appendix A):
Theorem 2
Let Π be the set of laws of a well-defined domain description, R an answer set of
tr(Π) and α a DLTL formula. The temporal model MR = (σ, V ) associated with
R satisfies α if and only if there is an answer set R′ of tr′(Π) such that R ⊂ R′
and sat(t alpha, 0) ∈ R′ (where t alpha is the term representing the formula α and
trans and final encode the automata indexing the until formulas in α).
The above formulation of sat is indeed the direct translation of the semantics
of DLTL, which is given for infinite models. Intuitively, we can show that it works
also when the model is represented as a k-loop, by considering the case of until
formulas. If S is a state belonging to the loop, the goal sat(αUA(q)β, S) can depend
cyclically on itself. This happens if the only rule which can be applied to prove the
satisfiability of αUA(q)β (or one of its derived formulas in each state of the loop)
is the second rule of until. In this case, sat(αUA(q)β, S) will be undefined, which
amounts to say that αUA(q)β is not true. This is correct, since, if this happens, α
must be true in each state of the loop, and β must be false in all states of the loop
corresponding to final states of A. Thus, by unfolding the cyclic sequence into an
infinite sequence, αUA(q)β will never be satisfied.
Given a domain description D = (Π, C), the translation tr(D) of D contains: the
translation tr(Π) of Π, the definition of the predicates sat, trans and final, and,
for each temporal formula α in C, the constraint ← not sat(t alpha, 0).
Let (Π, C) be a well-defined domain description over Σ. Given Theorems 1 and 2
above, it can be proved that:
Corollary 1
There is a one to one correspondence between the extensions of the domain descrip-
tion D and the answer sets of its translation tr(D) in ASP.
More precisely, each extension ofD is in a one to one correspondence with an answer
set of tr(D), and both of them are associated with the same temporal model.
Given a temporal formula α, we may want to check if there is an extension of the
domain description D satisfying it. To this purpose, as for the temporal formulas
in C, we add to the translation tr(D) of D the constraint← not sat(t alpha, 0), so
that the answer sets falsifying α are excluded.
According to the bounded model checking technique, the search for an extension
of the domain description satisfying α is done by iteratively increasing the length
k of the sequence searched for, until a cyclic model is found (if one exists). On
the other hand, validity of a formula α can be proved, as usual in model checking,
by verifying that D extended with ¬α is not satisfiable. Let us consider, from
Example 2, the property ✷(mail(b) ⊃ ✸¬mail(b)) (if there is mail for b, the agent
will eventually deliver it to b). This formula is valid if its negation ✸¬(mail(b) ⊃
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✸¬mail(b)) is not satisfiable. We verify the satisfiability of this formula, by adding
to the translation of the domain description the constraint
← not sat(ev(neg(impl(mail(b), ev(neg(mail(b)))))), 0).
and looking for an extension. The resulting set of rules indeed has extensions, which
can be found for k ≥ 3 and provide counterexamples to the validity of the prop-
erty above. For instance, the extension in which next(0, 1), next(1, 2), next(2, 3),
next(3, 0), occurs(begin, 0), occurs(sense mail(a), 1), occurs(sense mail(b), 2),
occurs(deliver mail(a), 3), where mail(b) holds in all states, and mail(a) only in
states 2 and 3, can be obtained for k = 3.
In Appendix B we provide the encoding of BMC and of Example 2 in the DLV-
Complex extension (https://www.mat.unical.it/dlv-complex) of DLV (Leone et al. 2006).
In Appendix C we report tests of our approach for bounded model checking of DLTL
formulas in the line of the LTL BMC experiments in (Heljanko and Niemela¨ 2003).
Results are provided for a DLV encoding of BMC and of action domain descriptions
for the dining philosophers problems considered in that paper. The scalability of
the two approaches is similar.
8 Conclusions and related work
In this paper we have described an action language which is based on a tempo-
ral extension of ASP, in which temporal modalities are included within rules. In
the action language, general temporal DLTL formulas (possibly including regular
programs indexing temporal modalities) are allowed in the domain description to
constrain the space of possible extensions. The approach naturally deals with non-
terminating computations and relies on bounded model checking techniques for the
verification of temporal formulas. In (Giordano et al. 2001) a temporal action the-
ory has been developed, which is based on the linear temporal logic DLTL and
adopts a monotonic solution to the frame problem based on completion. Due to the
different treatment of the frame problem, even in the case when default negation is
not present in the body of the laws in Π, the notion of extension defined here is not
equivalent to the one in (Giordano et al. 2001), which requires action and causal
laws to be stratified to avoid unexpected extensions due to cyclic dependencies.
Bounded model checking (BMC) (Biere et al. 2003) is based on the idea to search
for a counterexample of the property to be checked in executions which are bounded
by some integer k. SAT-based BMC methods do not suffer from the state explo-
sion problem as the methods based on BDDs. (Heljanko and Niemela¨ 2003) exploit
BMC in the verification of asynchronous systems modeled by 1-safe Petri nets. They
provide a translation of a Petri net to a logic program which captures the execution
of the net up to n steps and they develop a compact encoding of BMC of LTL for-
mulas as the problem of finding stable models of logic programs. As a difference, the
work in this paper aims at verifying properties of a temporal action theory including
DLTL temporal constraints. Hence, we provide a translation of the action theory
into ASP and we extend the encoding of BMC in (Heljanko and Niemela¨ 2003) to
deal with DLTL formulas.
Our encoding of BMC of LTL formulas in ASP does not make use of the Bu¨chi
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automaton construction to build the path satisfying a formula. As future work, we
aim at exploring an alternative approach which exploits the Bu¨chi automaton of
the formula to achieve completeness of BMC.
Stemming from the seminal paper of Gelfond and Lifschitz on the action lan-
guage A (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1993), a lot of work has been devoted to define
logic-based action languages. In particular, ASP has been shown to be well suited
for reasoning about dynamic domains (Gelfond 2007). (Baral and Gelfond 2000)
provide an encoding in ASP of the action specification language AL, which extends
the action description language A by allowing static and dynamic causal laws, exe-
cutability conditions and concurrent actions. The proposed approach has been used
for planning (Tu et al. 2011) and diagnosis (Balduccini and Gelfond 2003).
The action language defined in this paper can be regarded as a temporal ex-
tension of the language A (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1993) which allows for general
temporal constraints, complex actions and infinite computations, but does not deal
with concurrent actions nor with incomplete knowledge. As regards laws in Π, our
temporal action language has strong relations with the action languages K and C.
The logic-based planning language, K (Eiter et al. 2003; Eiter et al. 2004) is well
suited for planning under incomplete knowledge and allows for concurrent actions.
The main construct of K are causation rules of the form: caused f if B after
A, meaning “If B is known to be true in the current state and A is known to be
true in the previous state, then f is known to be true in the current state”. Default
negation can be used in the body of the rules and A may contain action atoms. The
semantics of planning domains is defined in terms of states and transitions.
The temporal action language introduced in Section 3 for defining the component
Π of the domain description can be regarded, apart from minor differences, as a
fragment of K in which concurrent actions are not allowed. In particular, action
laws (1) and dynamic causal laws (3):
✷([a]l0 ← (not)l1, . . . , (not)lm, (not)[a]lm+1, . . . , (not)[a]lk)
✷(©l0 ← (not)l1, . . . , (not)lm, (not)© lm+1, . . . , (not)© lk)
can be mapped to the causation rules:
caused l0 if (not)lm+1 . . . , (not)lk after a, (not)l1, . . . , (not) lm
caused l0 if (not)lm+1 . . . , (not)lk after (not)l1, . . . , (not) lm
with the proviso, for dynamic causal laws, thatm ≥ 1. In case the literals (not)l1, . . . ,
(not)lm are not present (and the after part of the causation rule is empty), our
dynamic causal law does not produce any effect on the initial state (which is not
the next state of any other state) while the causation rule does. For this reason, our
static causal laws can then be mapped to causation rules with empty after part.
A similar translation can be given to precondition laws, which are special kinds of
action laws and to initial state laws, which can be mapped to initial state causation
rules in K. All actions are regarded as being always executable, i.e., executable
a, holds for all actions a. The correctness of this mapping emerges form the ASP
encoding of our temporal language, which is similar, apart from minor differences,
to the translation of K to answer set programming (Eiter et al. 2003).
The system DLV K provides an implementation of K on top of the disjunctive
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logic programming system DLV. DLV K does not only solve optimistic planning
problems, but also secure planning problems under incomplete initial states (con-
formant planning). DLV K does not appear to support other kinds of reasoning
besides planning, and, in particular, does not allow to express or verify temporal
properties nor to reason about infinite computations.
The languages C and C+ (Giunchiglia and Lifschitz 1998; Giunchiglia et al. 2004)
also deal with actions with indirect and nondeterministic effects and with concur-
rent actions, and are based on nonmonotonic causation rules syntactically similar to
those of K, where head and body of causation rules can be boolean combinations of
atoms. Their semantics is based on a nonmonotonic causal logic (Giunchiglia et al. 2004).
Causation rules can be represented in this logic by indexing fluents and actions with
an integer i (i = 0, . . . n), in such a way that models of the causal theory correspond
to histories of length n. The semantics of causal logic requires states to be complete.
Due to the differences between the underlying semantics, a mapping between our
action language and the languages C and C+ appears not to be straightforward.
If a C+ causal theory is definite (the head of a rule is an atom), it is possible
to reason about it by turning the theory into a set of propositional formulas by
means of a completion process, and then invoke a satisfiability solver. In this way
it is possible to perform various kinds of reasoning such as prediction, postdic-
tion or planning. However, the language does not exploits standard temporal logic
constructs to reason about actions.
In the context of planning, temporally extended goals allow the specification of
properties that have to be achieved in the states along the execution of the plan. The
need for state trajectory constraints has been advocated, for instance, in PDDL3
(Gerevini and Long 2005), the domain description language used in the 2006 Inter-
national Planning Competition. (Bacchus and Kabanza 2000) exploits a first order
linear temporal logic for defining domain dependent search control knowledge in
the planner TLPlan. (Pistore and Traverso 2001) define a planning algorithm that
generates plans for extended goals in a nondeterministic domain, where extended
goals are CTL formulas. (Son et al. 2006) shows that temporal control knowledge
can be incorporated in a planner written in ASP. It provides a translation of a
planning problem whose domain is defined in the action language B into ASP
as well as a translation of the temporal constraints on the domain. The work on
temporally extended goals in (Dal Lago et al. 2002; Baral and Zhao 2007) is con-
cerned with expressing preferences among goals and exceptions in goal specifica-
tion. (Son and Pontelli 2006; Bienvenu et al. 2006) introduce languages including
temporal operators for expressing preferences on solutions of planning problems.
(Son and Pontelli 2006), in particular, builds on answer set planning, i.e., comput-
ing plans in ASP; the computation of preferred plans is also mapped to ASP, relying
on an optimization predicate. As a difference with the proposals above, in this pa-
per we do not specifically focus on planning. Our language is intended to address
several different reasoning tasks (including property verification) on rich domain
descriptions, allowing for ramifications, nondeterministic and complex actions, in-
complete initial states, and, in particular, it can be used for reasoning about infinite
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computations. However, in this paper, we do not address the problem of expressing
preferences among goals.
As our language includes program expressions in the temporal formulas, it is
related to the Golog language (Levesque et al. 1997), in which complex actions
(plans) can be formalized as Algol-like programs. ESG (Claßen and Lakemeyer 2008)
is a second order extension of CTL* for reasoning about nonterminating Golog
programs. In ESG programs include, besides regular expressions, nondeterministic
choice of arguments and concurrent composition. The paper presents a method for
verification of a first order CTL fragment of ESG, using model checking and re-
gression based reasoning. Because of first order quantification, this fragment is in
general undecidable. DLTL (Henriksen and Thiagarajan 1999) can be regarded as
a decidable LTL fragment of ESG. Satisfiability in DLTL is known to be PSPACE-
complete (Henriksen and Thiagarajan 1999), as for LTL.
Observe that, although our temporal answer sets are, in general, infinite, we
do not need to exploit specific techniques for reasoning about infinite answer sets
(Bonatti 2004), due to the property that an infinite path can be finitely represented
as a k-loop.
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Appendix A
We prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Let (Π, C) be a well-defined domain de-
scription over Σ. We show that there is a one to one correspondence between the
temporal answer sets of Π and the answer sets of the translation tr(Π).
Theorem 1
(1) Given a temporal answer set (σ, S) of Π such that σ can be finitely represented
as a finite path with a k-loop, there is a consistent answer set R of tr(Π) such
that R and S correspond to the same temporal model.
(2) Given a consistent answer set R of tr(Π), there is a temporal answer set (σ, S)
of Π (that can be finitely represented as a finite path with a back loop) such
that R and S correspond to the same temporal model.
Proof
Let us prove item (1). Let (σ, S) be a temporal answer set of Π such that σ can be
finitely represented as a finite path with a back loop, i.e.,
σ = a1a2 . . . ajaj+1 . . . ak+1aj+1 . . . ak+1 . . .
We construct an answer set R of tr(Π) as follows. R contains the following literals:
state(0), . . . , state(k)
next(0, 1), next(1, 2), . . . , next(k − 1, k), next(k, j), ¬next(k, s), for all s 6= j
occurs(a1, 0), occurs(a2, 1), ..., occurs(aj+1, j), ..., occurs(ak+1, k)
¬occurs(a, s), for all other ground instances of predicate occurs,
eq last(j)
for all i = 0, . . . , k, for all fluent names f ∈ P :
(¬)holds(f, i) ∈ R if and only if [a1; . . . ; ai](¬)f ∈ S
From the consistency of S, it is easy to see that R is a consistent set of literals. To
show that R is an answer set of tr(Π), we show that: (i) R is closed under tr(Π)R;
(ii) R is minimal (in the sense of set inclusion) among the consistent sets of literals
closed under tr(Π)R.
(i) For all the rules r in tr(Π)R, we have to prove that if the literals in the body
of r belong to R, then the head of r belongs to R. Let us consider the case when
the rule r in tr(Π)R is obtained by translating an action law in Π, of the form:
✷([a](¬)f ← t1, . . . , tm, not tm+1, . . . , not tn)
(the other cases are similar). In this case, tr(Π) contains the translation of the
action law above:
(¬)holds(f, S′)← state(S), S′ = S + 1, occurs(a, S), h1 . . . hm, not hm+1 . . . not hn
where hi = (¬)holds(fi, S
′) if ti = [a](¬)fi or hi = (¬)holds(fi, S) if ti = (¬)fi.
Let us consider the ground instantiation of the rule above from which r is ob-
tained. Suppose S is instantiated with some s ∈ {1, . . . , k}. It must be the case that
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a = as+1, as occurs(as+1, s) ∈ R and no other action occurs in state s according to
R.
If the rule r:
(¬)holds(f, s+ 1)← state(s), occurs(as+1, s), h
′
1 . . . h
′
m (8)
belongs to the reduct tr(Π)R (where each h′t is the ground instantiation of ht with
S = s), then h′m+1 6∈ R, . . . , h
′
n 6∈ R.
We have to show that, if the body of (8) belongs to R then its head also belongs
to R.
Assume h′1, . . . , h
′
m belong to R. For each i = 1 . . . ,m, either h
′
i = (¬)holds(fi, s)
(if ti = (¬)fi) or h
′
i = (¬)holds(fi, s+ 1) (if ti = [a](¬)fi). If h
′
i = (¬)holds(fi, s),
by construction of R, [a1; . . . ; as](¬)fi ∈ S, i.e., (σ, S), a1, . . . , as |= (¬)fi, and
hence, (σ, S), a1, . . . , as |= ti. If h
′
i = (¬)holds(fi, s + 1), by construction of R,
[a1; . . . ; as; as+1](¬)fi ∈ S, i.e., (σ, S), a1, . . . , as, as+1 |= (¬)fi, hence, [a1; . . . ; as;
as+1](¬)fi ∈ S, and then (σ, S), a1, . . . , as |= [as+1](¬)fi. Thus, (σ, S), a1, . . . , as |=
ti. So the positive literals in the temporal action law are satisfied.
To show that the negated literals tm+1, . . . , tn in the body of the temporal
clause are not satisfied in (σ, S) at a1, . . . , as, consider the fact that h
′
m+1 6∈
R, . . . , h′n 6∈ R. Again, for each i = m + 1, . . . , k, either h
′
i = (¬)holds(fi, s))
or h′i = (¬)holds(fi, s+ 1).
If h′i = (¬)holds(fi, s) 6∈ R, by construction of R, [a1; . . . ; as](¬)fi 6∈ S, i.e.,
(σ, S), a1, . . . , as 6|= (¬)fi, and hence, (σ, S), a1, . . . , as 6|= ti. If h
′
i = (¬)holds(fi, s+
1) 6∈ R, by construction of R, [a1; . . . ; as; as+1](¬)fi 6∈ S, hence, (σ, S), a1, . . . , as 6|=
[as+1](¬)fi. Thus, (σ, S), a1, . . . , as 6|= ti.
We have shown that the body of the temporal rule
✷([a](¬)f ← t1, . . . , tm, not tm+1, . . . , not tn)
is true in (σ, S) at a1, . . . , as, i.e.,
(σ, S), a1, . . . , as |= t1, . . . , tm, not tm+1, . . . , not tn
As the temporal rule belongs to Π and is satisfied in (σ, S), we can conclude that
its head is also satisfied in a1, . . . , as, i.e., (σ, S), a1, . . . , as |= [a](¬)f , namely,
[a1; . . . ; as; a](¬)f ∈ S. As we observed above, a = as+1, hence, [a1; . . . ; as; as+1](¬)f ∈
S and, by construction of R, (¬)holds(f, s+ 1) ∈ R.
To prove (ii), we have to show that R is minimal (in the sense of set inclusion)
among the consistent sets of literals closed under tr(Π)R. Suppose R is not minimal,
and there is a consistent set of literals R′ which is closed under tr(Π)R and such
that R′ ⊂ R.
Suppose there is a literal A ∈ R such that A 6∈ R′. For the auxiliary predicates
occurs, next, etc., it is easy to see that this cannot be the case. Let us consider the
case A = (¬)holds(f, i) and suppose that (¬)holds(f, i) ∈ R and (¬)holds(f, i) 6∈
R′.
We show that we can construct from R′ an S′ ⊂ S such that (σ, S′) satisfies the
rules in Π(σ,S). We define S′ as follows:
[a1; . . . ; ah](¬)f ∈ S
′ if and only if (¬)holds(f, h) ∈ R′
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It can be shown that (σ, S′) satisfies the rules in Π(σ,S). In fact, for each rule r in
Π(σ,S) whose body is satisfied in (σ, S′), there is a rule r′ in tr(Π)R, whose body
is true in R′. As R′ is closed under tr(Π)R, the head of r′ must be true in R′. By
construction of S′, the head of r is satisfied in (σ, S′).
As S′ ⊂ S and (σ, S′) satisfies the rules in Π(σ,S), S is not minimal among the
interpretations S′′ such that (σ, S′′) satisfies the rules in Π(σ,S). This contradicts
the hypothesis that (σ, S) is a temporal answer set of Π.
As the domain description is well-defined, (σ, S) has to be a total temporal answer
set. Hence, for each state i = 1, . . . , k, either holds(p, i) ∈ R or ¬holds(p, i) ∈ R.
It is easy to see that R and (σ, S) correspond to the same temporal model, as MS
and MR are defined over the same sequence σ and, for each finite prefix τ of σ,
they give the same evaluation to atomic propositions in τ .
Let us prove item (2).
Let R be an answer set of tr(Π). We define a temporal answer set (σ, S) of Π as
follows.
Given the definition of the predicates next and occurs in tr(Π), R must contain,
for some k and j, and for some a1, . . . , ak+1, the literals:
next(0, 1), next(1, 2), . . . , next(k − 1, k), next(k, j),
occurs(a1, 0), occurs(a2, 1), ..., occurs(aj+1, j), ..., occurs(ak+1, k),
eq last(j).
We define σ as:
σ = a1a2 . . . ajaj+1 . . . ak+1aj+1 . . . ak+1 . . .
We determine the temporal literals that belong to S as follows: for all i = 0, . . . , k
for all fluent names f ∈ P :
[a1; . . . ; ai](¬)f ∈ S if and only if (¬)holds(f, i) ∈ R
From the consistency of R, it is easy to see that S is a consistent set of temporal
literals. To show that S is a temporal answer set of Π, we show that:
(i) (σ, S) satisfies all the rules in Π(σ,S);
(ii) S is minimal (in the sense of set inclusion) among the S′ such that (σ, S′) is a
partial interpretation satisfying the rules in Π(σ,S).
(i) Let us prove that (σ, S) satisfies all the rules in Π(σ,S). Let
[a1, . . . , as](H ← t1, . . . , tm)
be a rule in Π(σ,S), where a1, . . . as ∈ prf(σ). Then there must be a law in Π of the
form:
✷(H ← t1, . . . , tm, not tm+1, . . . , not tn)
such that (σ, S), a1 . . . as 6|= ti, for i = m+ 1, . . . , n.
Let us consider the case where such a law is a dynamic causal law, (the other
cases are similar). In this case, H =©(¬)f and the law has the form:
✷(©(¬)f ← t1, . . . , tm, not tm+1, . . . , not tn)
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where, for all i = 1, . . . , n, ti = (¬)fi or ti =©(¬)fi.
Then, tr(Π) contains its translation:
(¬)holds(f, S′)← state(S), S′ = S + 1, h1 . . . hm, not hm+1 . . . not hn
where hi = (¬)holds(fi, S
′) (if ti =©(¬)fi) or hi = (¬)holds(fi, S) (if ti = (¬)fi).
Let us consider the ground instantiation of the rule above with S = s, for some
s ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
(¬)holds(f, s+ 1)← state(s), h′1 . . . h
′
m, not h
′
m+1 . . . not h
′
n
where h′i = (¬)holds(fi, s + 1) (if ti = ©(¬)fi) or h
′
i = (¬)holds(fi, s) (if ti =
(¬)fi).
The rule
(¬)holds(f, s+ 1)← state(s), h′1 . . . h
′
m (9)
must belong to the reduct tr(Π)R. In fact, we can prove that h′m+1 6∈ R, . . . , h
′
n 6∈
R. Let ti = (¬)fi and h
′
i = (¬)holds(fi, s). From the hypothesis, we know that
(σ, S), a1 . . . as 66|= ti, i.e., (σ, S), a1 . . . as 66|= (¬)fi, i.e., [a1; . . . ; as](¬)fi 6∈ S. As,
by construction of (σ, S), (¬)holds(fi, s) ∈ R iff [a1; . . . ; as](¬)fi ∈ S, we conclude
(¬)holds(fi, s) 6∈ R. Let ti = ©(¬)fi and h
′
i = (¬)holds(fi, s + 1). From the
hypothesis, we know that (σ, S), a1 . . . as 6|= ti, i.e., (σ, S), a1 . . . as 6|= ©(¬)fi, i.e.,
[a1; . . . ; as; as+1](¬)fi 6∈ S. As, by construction of (σ, S), (¬)holds(fi, s+1) ∈ R iff
[a1; . . . ; as+1](¬)fi ∈ S, we conclude (¬)holds(fi, s+ 1) 6∈ R, that is h
′
i 6∈ R.
To show that the law
[a1, . . . , as](H ← t1, . . . , tm)
in Π(σ,S) is satisfied in (σ, S), let us assume that its body is satisfied in (σ, S), that
is, (σ, S), a1 . . . as |= t1, . . . , tm, i.e., (σ, S), a1 . . . as |= ti, for all i = 1, . . . ,m. By the
same pattern of reasoning as above, we can show that h′i ∈ R, for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
As rule (9) is in tr(Π)R, its body is true in R, and R is closed under tr(Π)R, then
the head of (9), (¬)holds(f, s+ 1), belongs to R. Hence, by construction of (σ, S),
[a1; . . . ; as]© (¬)f ∈ S, that is (σ, S), a1 . . . as |= H , namely, the head of the rule
[a1, . . . , as](H ← t1, . . . , tm)
is satisfied in (σ, S).
(ii) S is minimal (in the sense of set inclusion) among the S′ such that (σ, S′) is
a partial interpretation satisfying the rules in Π(σ,S).
Assume by contradiction that S is not minimal. Then, there is a partial inter-
pretation (σ, S′), with S′ ⊂ S, satisfying the rules in Π(σ,S).
We show that we can construct an R′ ⊂ R such that R′ is closed under tr(Π)R.
We define R′ as R, but for the predicate holds, for which we have:
(¬)holds(f, h) ∈ R′ if and only if [a1; . . . ; ah](¬)f ∈ S
′
It can be shown that R′ is closed under tr(Π)R. In fact, for each rule r in tr(Π)R
whose body is true in R′, there is a rule r′ in Π(σ,S), whose body is satisfied in
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(σ, S′). As (σ, S′) satisfies all the rules in Π(σ,S), the head of r′ must be satisfied in
(σ, S′). By construction of R′, the head of r belongs to R′.
As R′ ⊂ R and R′ is closed under tr(Π)R, R is not minimal among the consistent
sets of literals closed under tr(Π)R. This contradicts the hypothesis that R is an
answer set of tr(Π).
To prove that R and (σ, S) correspond to the same temporal model we can use
the same argument as for item (1).
Theorem 2
Let Π be the set of laws of a well-defined domain description, R an answer set
of tr(Π) and α a DLTL formula. The temporal model MR = (σ, V ) associated with
R satisfies α if and only if there is an answer set R′ of tr′(Π) such that R ⊂ R′
and sat(t alpha, 0) ∈ R′ (where t alpha is the term representing the formula α and
trans and final encode the automata indexing the until formulas in α).
Proof
We first prove the ”only if” direction of the theorem. We know by Theorem 1 that
each answer set R of tr(Π) corresponds to a temporal answer set of Π and, for each
state i = 1, . . . , k, either holds(p, i) ∈ R or ¬holds(p, i) ∈ R. Let us consider the
temporal model MR = (σR, VR) associated with R, as defined in section 7.
We extend R to define an answer set R′ of tr′(Π) as follows:
• all the literals in R belong to R′;
• for all subformulas β of α, for all states h ∈ {0, . . . , k}:
sat(t beta, h) ∈ R′ if and only if MR, τh |= β (10)
where τh = a1 . . . ah and t beta is the term encoding the formula β.
• For each automaton aut = (Q, δ,QF ) indexing an until formula in α:
final(aut, q) ∈ R′ if and only if q ∈ Qf (11)
trans(aut, q1, a, q2) ∈ R
′ if and only if q2 ∈ δ(q1, a) (12)
We can show that R′ is an answer set of tr′(Π), i.e., (i) R′ is closed under tr′(Π)R
′
(ii)R′ is minimal among the consistent sets of literals closed under tr′(Π)R
′
.
(i) holds trivially for all the rules in tr(Π). It has to be proved for all the rules
defining the predicate sat. We can procede by cases:
Let us consider the rule for fluents. Suppose R′ satisfies the body of a ground
instance of the rule:
sat(F, S) : −fluent(F ), holds(F, S).
that is, fluent(p) ∈ R′ and holds(p, h) ∈ R′, for some fluent name p and some
h ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Then, holds(p, h) ∈ R, and thus Mr, τh |= p. By construction of R
′,
it must be: sat(p, h) ∈ R′.
Let us consider the first rule for until. Suppose R′ satisfies the body of a ground
instance of the rule:
sat(until(Aut,Q,Alpha,Beta), S) : −final(Aut,Q), sat(Beta, S).
that is, for some aut encoding a finite automaton A = (Q, δ,QF ), for some q ∈
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Q, for some formula t beta and state h, final(aut, q) ∈ R′ (i.e., q ∈ QF ) and
sat(t beta, h) ∈ R′. By construction of R′, MR, τh |= β. As q is a final state of the
finite automaton A, it must be that MR, τh |= αU
A(q)β. Hence, by construction,
sat(until(aut, q, t alpha, t beta), h) ∈ R′.
The other cases are similar.
(ii) We prove that R′ is minimal among the consistent sets of literals closed under
tr′(Π)R
′
. Let us suppose that R′ is not minimal and that there is an R′′ ⊂ R′ such
that R′′ is closed with respect to tr′(Π)R
′
. There must be a literal l ∈ R′ − R′′. l
cannot be a literal in R, as R is an answer set of tr(Π), and the definition of the
predicates in R does not depend on the predicates sat, trans and final introduced
in tr′(Π). Also, l cannot be a trans and final literal, as these predicates are only
defined by ground atomic formulas, which must be all in R′′. Suppose there is
sat(t alpha, h) ∈ R′ such that sat(t alpha, h) 6∈ R′′.
Using the fact that R′′ is closed with respect to tr′(Π)R
′
, it can be proved that,
for all the subformulas β of α, if MR, τh |= β then sat(t beta, h) ∈ R
′′. The proof is
by induction on the structure of β.
As sat(t alpha, h) ∈ R′, by construction of R′ it must be that MR, τh |= α.
Then, by the previous property, sat(t alpha, h) ∈ R′′. This contradicts the fact
that sat(t alpha, h) 6∈ R′′. Hence, R′ is an answer set of tr(Π).
To conclude the proof of the “only if” part, it is easy to see that, from (12), if
MR, ε |= α then sat(t alpha, 0) ∈ R
′, where ε represents the empty sequence of
actions.
We have shown that, given an answer set R of tr(Π) satisfying α we can construct
an answer set R′ of tr′(Π) such that sat(t alpha, 0) ∈ R′. To prove the ”if” direction
of the theorem, let us assume that there is an answer set R′′ of tr′(Π) such that R′′
extends R and sat(t alpha, 0) ∈ R′′. We can show that R′′ must coincide with R′
built above. In fact, it can be easily proved that, for all subformulas β of α,
sat(t beta, h) ∈ R′′ iff sat(t beta, h) ∈ R′
The proof can be done by induction on the structure of β (observe that both R′
and R′′ extend R, which provides the evaluation of fluent formulas to be used by
the sat predicate). As R′′ coincides with R′, if sat(t alpha, 0) ∈ R′′ then by (12),
MR, ε |= α.
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Appendix B
In this appendix we provide the encoding of BMC and Example 2 in DLV-
Complex (https://www.mat.unical.it/dlv-complex).
state(0..#maxint).
laststate(N):- state(N), #maxint=N+1.
% general rules
occurs(A,S):- not ~occurs(A,S), action(A),state(S),laststate(L),S<=L.
~occurs(B,S):- occurs(A,S), action(A),state(S),action(B),A!=B.
next(S,SN):- state(S), laststate(LS), S<LS, SN=S+1.
-next(LS,S):- laststate(LS), next(LS,SS), state(S), state(SS), S!=SS.
next(LS,S):- laststate(LS), state(S), S<=LS, not -next(LS,S).
:- laststate(LS), next(LS,S), not eq_last(S).
diff_last(S):- state(S), S<#maxint, fluent(F),
holds(F,S), -holds(F,#maxint).
diff_last(S):- state(S), S<#maxint, fluent(F),
holds(F,#maxint), -holds(F,S).
eq_last(S):- state(S), S<#maxint, not diff_last(S).
% The action theory makes use of the predicates:
% action(A), fluent(FL), holds(FL,State)
% evaluation of DLTL formulas
% makes use of predicate formula(F)
% true
sat(true,S):- state(S).
% fluents
sat(F,S):- fluent(F), state(S), holds(F,S).
% not
sat(neg(Alpha),S):- formula(neg(Alpha)), state(S), not sat(Alpha,S).
% or
sat(or(Alpha1,Alpha2),S):- formula(or(Alpha1,Alpha2)), state(S),
sat(Alpha1,S).
sat(or(Alpha1,Alpha2),S):- formula(or(Alpha1,Alpha2)), state(S),
sat(Alpha2,S).
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% until
% An automaton is specified by the predicates
% trans(Automaton,Q1,Action,Q2) and
% final(Automaton,Q)
sat(until(Aut,Q,Alpha,Beta),S):-
formula(until(Aut,Q,Alpha,Beta)),
final(Aut,Q),
sat(Beta,S),
state(S).
sat(until(Aut,Q,Alpha,Beta),S):-
formula(until(Aut,Q,Alpha,Beta)),
sat(Alpha,S),
trans(Aut,Q,Act,Q1),
action(Act),
occurs(Act,S),
next(S,S1),
sat(until(Aut,Q1,Alpha,Beta),S1).
% derived operators and modalities
% ev(Alpha) means <>Alpha
% diamond(Az,Alpha) means <Az>Alpha
% box(Az,Alpha) means [Az]Alpha
sat(and(Alpha1,Alpha2),S):- formula(and(Alpha1,Alpha2)),
state(S),
sat(Alpha1,S), sat(Alpha2,S).
sat(impl(Alpha1,Alpha2),S):- formula(impl(Alpha1,Alpha2)),
state(S),
not sat(Alpha1,S).
sat(impl(Alpha1,Alpha2),S):- formula(impl(Alpha1,Alpha2)),
state(S),
sat(Alpha2,S).
sat(diamond(A,Alpha),S):- formula(diamond(A,Alpha)),
action(A), state(S),
occurs(A,S),
next(S,SN),
sat(Alpha,SN).
sat(ev(Alpha),S):- formula(ev(Alpha)),
state(S),
sat(Alpha,S).
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sat(ev(Alpha),S):- formula(ev(Alpha)),
state(S),
next(S,SN),
sat(ev(Alpha),SN).
sat(box(A,Alpha),S):- formula(box(A,Alpha)),
action(A), state(S), action(B), formula(Alpha),
occurs(B,S),
A!=B.
sat(box(A,Alpha),S):- formula(box(A,Alpha)),
state(S),
occurs(A,S),
next(S,SN),
sat(Alpha,SN).
% the following rules define all subformulas of a given formula
formula(F):- formula(neg(F)).
formula(F1):- formula(or(F1,F2)).
formula(F2):- formula(or(F1,F2)).
formula(F1):- formula(until(Aut,Q,F1,F2)).
formula(F2):- formula(until(Aut,Q,F1,F2)).
formula(until(Aut,Q1,Alpha,Beta)):- formula(until(Aut,Q,Alpha,Beta)),
trans(Aut,Q,Act,Q1).
formula(F1):- formula(and(F1,F2)).
formula(F2):- formula(and(F1,F2)).
formula(F1):- formula(impl(F1,F2)).
formula(F2):- formula(impl(F1,F2)).
formula(F):- formula(diamond(A,F)).
formula(F):- formula(ev(F)).
formula(F):- formula(box(A,F)).
% Encoding of Example 2
room(a).
room(b).
action(begin).
action(sense_mail(R)):- room(R).
action(deliver(R)):- room(R).
action(wait).
fluent(mail(R)):- room(R).
% action effects
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holds(mail(R),SN):-
room(R), occurs(sense_mail(R),S), SN=S+1,
not -holds(mail(R),SN).
-holds(mail(R),SN):-
room(R), occurs(deliver(R),S), SN=S+1.
% persistency
holds(F,SN):-
holds(F,S),
SN=S+1,
not -holds(F,SN).
-holds(F,SN):-
~holds(F,S),
SN=S+1,
not holds(F,SN).
%preconditions
:- occurs(deliver(R),S), -holds(mail(R),S).
:- occurs(wait,S), holds(mail(R),S).
%initial state
holds(mail(R),0):- room(R), not -holds(mail(R),0).
-holds(mail(R),0):- room(R), not holds(mail(R),0).
% temporal constraints
formula(diamond(begin,true)).
:- not sat(diamond(begin,true),0).
formula(neg(ev(neg(box(begin,until(aut,q1,true,true)))))).
trans(aut,q1,sense_mail(a),q2).
trans(aut,q2,sense_mail(b),q3).
trans(aut,q3,deliver(a),q4).
trans(aut,q3,deliver(b),q4).
trans(aut,q3,wait,q4).
trans(aut,q4,begin,q5).
final(aut,q5).
:- not sat(neg(ev(neg(box(begin,until(aut,q1,true,true))))),0).
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% counterexample (negated property)
formula(ev(neg(impl(mail(b),ev(neg(mail(b))))))).
:- not sat(ev(neg(impl(mail(b),ev(neg(mail(b)))))),0).
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Appendix C
In this appendix we report tests of our approach for bounded model check-
ing of DLTL formulas, in the line of the LTL BMC experiments in section 4 of
(Heljanko and Niemela¨ 2003).
In particular, we consider the dining philosophers problems and the LTL formulas
in section 4 of (Heljanko and Niemela¨ 2003); the relevant results are in Table 2 of
that paper, columns Int n and Int s, which provide, respectively, the smallest
integer such that a counterexample of length n can be found using the interleaving
semantics, and the time in seconds to find the counterexample. The interleaving
semantics is the relevant one since in this paper we do not consider concurrent
actions.
The general approach of the present paper can be directly mapped to the DLV-
Complex extension of the DLV system, as shown in Appendix B. However, for a
fairer comparison with the results in (Heljanko and Niemela¨ 2003), we have tested
a representation of the dining philosophers problem, and of the LTL formulas to
be verified, in the DLV system rather than in its DLV-Complex extension. Apart
from not using parametric fluents and actions, this means that, rather than using
clauses (in section 7) such as
sat(or(Alpha,Beta), S) : −sat(Alpha, S).
sat(or(Alpha,Beta), S) : −sat(Beta, S).
we provide, given the formula to be verified, a unique name for the formula and all
its subformulas; and if a formula named gamma is the disjunction alpha ∨ beta of
formulas named alpha and beta, we provide the clauses:
sat(gamma, S) : −sat(alpha, S).
sat(gamma, S) : −sat(beta, S).
and similarly for other operators. Such clauses can be easily generated automatically
from the formula to be verified.
Moreover, we have applied some minor variation of the general approach in sec-
tion 7 of our paper, such as using DLV built-in predicates.
Table 1 reports the results obtained on a Dell PowerEdge server with 2 Intel
Xeon E5520 processors (2.26Ghz, 8M Cache) and 32 Gb of memory.
Column n is the same as the Int n column in Table 2 of (Heljanko and Niemela¨ 2003),
i.e., the smallest integer such that a counterexample of length n can be found.
Column “boundsmodels” is the analogous of the Int s column in their paper
(except that we include the result for 12 philosophers); it provides the running
times in seconds to find a counterexample, running on our machine the code from
http://www.tcs.hut.fi/kepa/experiments/boundsmodels/. The last column provides
the running times in seconds to find a counterexample running in DLV the programs
enclosed. The scalability of the approaches for such problems is similar, and this
provides some evidence that the approaches have similar practical relevance for
problems that can be represented easily in both of them.
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Problem n boundsmodels TemporalASP-DLV
DP(6) 8 0.1 0.1
DP(8) 10 1.4 2.4
DP(10) 12 29.1 115.7
DP(12) 14 7837.1 13036.2
Table 1. Dining philosophers results
